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Introduction
Following the civil unrest in Kenya in 2008 1 and Kenya's inability to prosecute the perpetrators of those crimes, 2 the ICC prosecutor initiated proceedings proprio motu against Mr Ruto and Mr Kenyatta. Mr Kenyatta excusal from attendance. 12 Given that the Appeals Chamber was deciding on the very same issue, the prosecution argued that it would be in line with the principle of 'judicial economy' to wait for the Appeals Chamber's decision. 13 The majority of the Chamber, however, disagreed, without giving any further explanation. 14 Judge Ozaki, in his partially dissenting opinion, confirmed that it is in the interests of all parties that 'proceedings are conducted efficiently and with minimal burden to the Court's system and resources'. 15 Nevertheless, he agreed with the Chamber's decision to proceed given the uncertainty regarding the timing of the Appeals Chamber's decision. 16 It is not straightforward to account for the Chamber's unwillingness to engage with the issue of judicial economy, or Judge Ozaki's dictum. The decision to proceed on the basis of the uncertainty surrounding the timing of the Appeals Chamber decision could, in fact, be interpreted as a precautionary measure to ensure that Mr Kenyatta's trial proceeds without undue delay, one of the elements of the right to a fair trial 17 .
Then again, Mr Kenyatta's trial was due to start in February 2014, 18 he was never subject to any forms of detention during these preliminary proceedings, and all charges were eventually withdrawn. 19 It seems therefore reasonable to deduce that, by Given that judicial economy can have an impact on the right to fair trial, this article argues that the ICC should have engaged in a more comprehensive analysis of the issue of judicial economy in order to provide a clear reasoning for the proceedings at hand rather than waiting for the Appeals Chamber's decision. The argument is framed within a specific aspect of the right to a fair trial, namely the right to be tried without undue delay, as the assumption made in this article is that there was a real concern that the delay in the proceedings would have affected Mr Kenyatta's right to a fair trial. The backdrop of this discussion is provided by a brief overview of the concept of fairness as a driving force for the right to a fair trial. This will be followed by an evaluation of the right to a fair trial, with a specific focus on the right to trial without undue delay. The section will also consider the rights-centred approach taken by the ICC, which confirms the importance to continue to develop and strengthen this aspect of the Court's activity. Lastly, the discussion will move to the concept of judicial economy, its current application by the ICC, and will put forward an argument for a wider approach in order to embed it within the right to a fair trial framework.
The concept of fairness
When the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 20 were established, the protection of the defendant's rights was a reassuring and timely addition to the international criminal justice machinery. In fact, the UN Secretary-General pointed out that the tribunal (the ICTY) must 'fully respect the international recognised standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings', 21 with a specific focus on the rights contained in Article 14 of the ICCPR. 22 However, one need to look at some of the tribunals' practices, from the illegal apprehension of alleged 
Fairness as an egalitarian model
To understand the prominence of the right to a fair trial, the concept of fairness deserves some attention, starting with Rawls' perspective. He identifies fairness as 'formal justice…an aspect of the rule of law which supports and secures legitimate expectations. One kind of injustice is the failure of judges and others in authority to adhere to the appropriate rules or interpretations thereof in deciding claims'.
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According to Rawls, fairness takes on an egalitarian character, where all enjoy the same rights, irrespective of any special status in society. This egalitarian concept may be interpreted as deriving from natural law, and therefore resembling an inherent feature (and entitlement) of the human condition to seek a fair and just treatment for all. 27 However, Rawls wrote his treatise with a specific kind of political structure in mind, namely a modern constitutional democracy. 28 Therefore, despite the attractive feature, the egalitarian aspect of fairness, as devised by Rawls, will only apply to a specific political society, because fairness is able to make use of concepts that are naturally entrenched within institutions of a democratic government.
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With this in mind, the most obvious starting point, for the purposes of this discussion on the right to a fair trial, is the justice system itself. As Rawls declares, 'justice is the Despite the fact that it would be unrealistic to establish a society or a legal system based on the purity of this worldview, it can be argued that, in the context of international judicial bodies and practices, the 'veil of ignorance' should represent a guiding policy and a clear objective in order to ensure fair treatment to all. In the context of (international) criminal trials, a correlation of this proposition is that, by guaranteeing fairness to all, justice is achieved for all parties through a consistent and transparent application of the rules. The egalitarian model of fairness can therefore be likened to 'procedural' fairness, and this is supported by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I in relation to the DRC situation:
The term "fairness" (equité), from the Latin "equus", means equilibrium, or balance. As a legal concept, equity, or fairness, "is a direct emanation of the idea of justice". Equity of the proceedings entails equilibrium between the two with the authority to develop unified law on an international level.
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The existence of any competing interests would have an undesirable impact on the application of substantive and procedural fairness, and it would also cast a shadow of doubt on the legitimacy of international tribunals. Yet, the argument about the possible presence of any competing interests has its basis on the Principal-Agent theory, whereby the Principal -the State -may be able to exercise a certain amount of influence on the Agent -the appointed international judge. 47 In practice, however, this is not an easy premise to validate. 48 A more adequate theory -and one that is in line with the aims of international justice -is the Trustee-Principal theory. 49 Unlike the agent, who has more autonomy but may feel bound by certain contractual obligations between him and the state, the trustee enhances …the legitimacy of political decision-making. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.
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In fact, one of the most encouraging characteristics of the Trustee-Principal theory is the underlying fiduciary relationship that exists between the trustee and the main actor, in this case the state. And it is precisely this fiduciary relationship that enhances the trustworthiness of the judicial decision-making process, thus reducing the possibility of abuse of power and maintaining legitimacy. 51 This theory finds support amongst many academics, including Posner and Yoo, 52 who contend, in fact, that judicial effectiveness at the international level can only be maintained if there exists a certain level of 'dependency' between the judges and the appointing state. They also argue that the typical independent domestic model finds no realistic application in the international context due to the complex political interplay. 53 Helfer and Slaughter, on the other hand, point to the limitations of their argument that independent judges endanger international courts' effectiveness, citing specifically the weaknesses of their methodology. They put forward a theory of 'constrained independence', according to which, the state demonstrates its credibility towards international commitments, but then uses other mechanisms to limit the power of judicial decisions.
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However, it can be argued that the emerging disparities regarding judicial legitimacy are essentially due to the different perspectives taken by the aforementioned Their starting point and analysis are different, but both models contend that the existence of a fiduciary relationship (between the state and the international tribunal) enhances both the 'dependent' and 'independent' tribunals, thus furthering fairness through legitimacy.
The Right to a Fair Trial

Setting the context
Although the right to a fair trial has evolved significantly over the past decades, it has been part of the fundamental guarantees for centuries. Early references to fair trial procedures can be dated back to the Lex Duodecim Tabularum (the Law of the Twelve Tables) in 450 B.C., the first written laws of the Roman Republic. 59 Some of the principles expressed at that time can be said to represent the forerunners to the modern procedural rights to a fair trial, namely that all parties to the dispute have the 55) Goldsmith can also be added as an advocate of this theory; see, for example, J Goldsmith and E Posner, The Magna Carta constitutes another development in the right to a fair trial, as it set out the principle that the law of the land curbed the power for all, including the sovereign king's, establishing the principle that all are equal before the law. 63 This document, however, must be interpreted as a product of its time, as the king was in fact the only lawmaker of the land. 64 Notwithstanding this, the Magna Carta -and specifically the provision that no free man can be imprisoned without the lawful pronouncement of his peers -was destined to become the cornerstone of the right to a fair trial, and started a trend that culminated in modern times. 65 In fact, the well- To this end, the majority of human rights legislation, at both domestic and international level, includes the right to trial without undue delay, or within a reasonable time. 77 In order to make a determination that this guarantee has been infringed, courts will consider several factors, including the length of the delay, the complexity of the proceedings, the conduct of the relevant authorities, the conduct of the accused and the prejudice to the accused. 78 This is a well-established practice within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and it therefore serves as a yardstick for other international tribunals. 79 Moreover, in General Comment No. 13, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) clarified the meaning of 'trial within a reasonable time', or 'without undue delay', and specified that the guarantee relates not only to the time by which a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and judgment be rendered; all stages must take place "without undue delay". To make this right effective, a procedure must be available in order to ensure that the trial will proceed "without undue delay", both in first instance and on appeal. unfolding on our television screens. 96 The ICC, however, is fundamentally different in nature from its ad hoc predecessors. It is a permanent treaty-based international court, established through the sovereign states' aspiration to end impunity for international crimes. As such, the ICC had to satisfy specific criteria in relation to state sovereignty. In other words, it must guarantee, inter alia, that its criminal procedures will echo the legitimate mandate given to it by consenting sovereign states.
There is, therefore, a strong correlation between the mandate given to the ICC, and the emerging standards expected in international criminal law proceedings. 
Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute and 'internationally recognised human rights'
Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute stipulates that 'the application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights…'. The content of this article represents the willingness of state parties to give the utmost assurance to defendants that the ICC may even be obligated to set aside rules that may conflict with international human rights norms. This is indeed a significant provision, and has been likened to a superior norm, 102 even to the point of amounting to a norm possessing a constitutional character, according to some academics. 103 It can also be asserted that this provision may in fact confer more powers to the court than originally conceived, 104 thus allowing the ICC chambers to widen their interpretation of the applicable law, 105 though there is no consensus yet on this point.
In the Lubanga case, 106 Judge Pikis stated that customary international law and international treaties represent strong indicators of the status of 'internationally recognised human rights'. As such, the right to a fair trial, according to his opinion, would qualify as an 'internationally recognised human right'. 107 The complexity of the International Criminal Court, however, should not be underestimated, especially as it deals with national laws, regional and international treaties, and other decisions, in order to find the correct interpretation to a provision that may be considered to be too vague. 108 As Sheppard writes:
Uncertainty with respect to the Court's applicable law imposes a great burden on all Remarkably, the language used in the victims' group response is evocative of one of the most prominent regional human rights instruments, namely the European Convention of Human Rights. 128 The Rome Statute is compared to a living instrument, and it therefore requires that 'its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective'. 129 If the Rome Statute is indeed a living instrument, then it must be capable of evolving according to new challenges, and Article 21(3) may indeed represent a new challenge with respect to the manner in which fair procedures are interpreted and applied. There is in fact an argument that Article 21(3) raises international human rights to a 'standard against which all the law applied by the Court should be tested', 130 leading to Article 21(3) conceivably becoming an 'overarching framework' of supra-legality, and even resembling the character of a jus cogens norm. 131 Though the Court does not have explicit jurisdiction to set aside provisions of the Rome Statute or even to re-interpret them in a manner that was not envisaged during the negotiation process, the full impact of Article 21(3) is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, the Rome Statute provisions in relation to fair trial, and the inclusion of Article 21(3), point towards the recognition of the centrality of human rights within this international criminal law regime. It is within this context that the discussion now moves towards an evaluation of the concept and use of judicial economy by the ICC, and its place within the human-rights centred approach adopted by the Court.
Fitting judicial economy within the right to a fair trial framework
Defining the scope of judicial economy
The discussion at the beginning of this article revealed that Trial Chamber ( courts, even though it is occasionally used as a strategic and political tool to satisfy member states.
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The specific procedures aimed at supporting judicial economy do not need to be explicitly incorporated in international instruments, as they are part of fundamental canons of adjudication, 136 and judges are indeed expected to make use of this principle. 137 The principles of res judicata and lis pendens represent some of the manifestations of judicial economy, and at the same time they embody the essence of a criminal trial. Essentially, 'with respect of the same crimes, there must not be two or more criminal trials simultaneously (lis pendens), or successively (…res judicata)'.
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Notably, some international instruments have explicitly incorporated them in their admissibility procedures 139 , and given proliferation of international tribunals, it is even more essential to strengthen the practice of judicial economy in order to avoid, at the very least, conflicting outcomes.
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In addition to the provision of a framework for judicial economy, these procedural mechanisms also contribute to the framework of the right to a fair trial, as they specifically protect defendants from overzealous prosecutorial practice. By the same token, it can be argued that there are certain elements of the concept of judicial economy that may sit uneasily within the right to a fair trial, as efficiency could compromise this fundamental right, though the right to be tried without undue delay needs to fit within this framework. Therefore, expeditiousness of proceedings can be considered as an element of the right to be tried without undue delay, though it is not to be evaluated independently.
There are other mechanisms, which, although not entirely part of the judicial economy framework, aim to expedite trials to ensure the right to be tried without interests and protect the interest of justice. 150 However, severance of charges or proceedings is subject to the consideration of several issues, including judicial economy, undue delay and the right to an expeditious trial. 151 Despite the fact that the severance procedure aims at supporting the right to be tried without undue delay, it is also possible that this procedure could have the opposite effect, as evidenced by the severance procedure applied in the Duch case by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 152 In this case several factors -the length of the indictment (400 pages), the age and poor health of the defendants and the limited resources -led to the application of the severance procedure in the interest of justice. 153 Nevertheless, the same procedure also led to complex challenges and uncertainties, not necessarily as a result of the severance procedure itself, but rather as a result of its poor execution. 154 The important lesson to learn with regard to severance and judicial economy is that the wider spectrum of fair trial rights must be taken into consideration when applying this procedure, and judges should manage it in a 'careful and proactive' manner. thus ensuring judicial economy by blocking unmeritorious cases to proceed to trial. 157 Similarly, an investigation of evidence of alibi will not be carried out if there is not sufficient evidence of criminal responsibility, ensuring judicial economy and fairness of proceedings. 158 Moreover, the evidentiary threshold itself, as set out in Article 61(7), is higher than the one required for the issuance of an arrest warrant or summons to appear, 159 thus protecting the suspect against wrongful prosecution and ensuring the application of judicial economy by carefully selecting the suitable cases to proceed to trial. 160 In the context of the efficient use of the Court's resources, 161 the joinder or severance procedure in respect of charges 162 also contributes to judicial economy. It allows witnesses to give evidence only once, thus minimising the impact of the proceedings on them, and avoids duplication of evidence. 163 Moreover, the early disclosure of the main lines of defence to the prosecution allows the latter to address them properly as they present their case, thus promoting justice and judicial economy. 164 These procedures ensure the fairness and speediness of the trial, whilst also protecting the rights of the victims and witnesses. 165 In addition, the right to ask questions to witnesses at trial is laid down in the ICC Rules 166 and inspired by judicial economy. 167 In the light of the above examples, the Court appears to make use of the concept of judicial economy in a very narrow sense, and adopts it in very limited circumstances.
The application of judicial economy at the ICC
The main issue with the Trial Chamber (B) discussion in the Kenyatta excusal decision is that the judges refused to engage with the principle of judicial economy.
This would have been an excellent opportunity to integrate the principle within the wider human rights framework. In fact, the manner in which the Chamber so readily dismissed the principle, leads to the conclusion that the ICC generally interprets judicial economy in a narrow sense only. This is in line with the examples cited above, which apply the principle of judicial economy as a filtering mechanism to ensure the Court proceeds with the prosecution of valid cases only.
Undue delay and judicial economy in Mr Kenyatta's excusal decision
In the Bemba case, 168 it was stated that the expeditiousness of the trial is one of the factors that secures the fairness of the trial proceedings. This is what prompted the admission of all evidence, which in turn was said to contribute to the accused being tried without undue delay. 169 However, both the defence and the prosecution appealed the decision on the basis that the expeditiousness in favor of the accused did not comply with the principle of orality, in accordance with Article 69 (2) of the Rome Statute. In fact, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's decision on the basis that expeditiousness, whilst an important factor of fair trial, cannot trump a legislative provision. 170 The Chamber emphasized that the principle of orality could be sidestepped only if such action was 'not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused or with the fairness of the trial generally', 171 something that the Trial Chamber failed to examine. 172 Accordingly, a procedure that leads to an expeditious trial -thus supporting the right to be tried without undue delay -does not necessarily imply that fairness is applied consistently across all participants to the proceedings. The right to be tried without undue delay exists within the overall principle of the right to a fair trial, and it therefore subsists within the overarching concept of fairness. In a sense, the right to be tried without undue delay tends to favor the accused, but fairness is a process that affects all participants in the criminal justice machinery. revealed that the accused was not going to suffer any prejudice, and efficiency therefore had to be prioritized.
Scenario 2
The complete lack of a reasoned discussion on the relevant issues led to inconsistency and disarray between Trial Chamber (B) and the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber reversed Trial Chamber (A) decision on excusal from attendance, and just before that reversal decision, Trial Chamber (B) decided to concur with Trial Chamber (A). There seems to be no explanation for this apparent misuse of resources.
Concluding remarks
The Chamber's outright rejection to engage with the principle of judicial economy demonstrated a real neglect for the wider picture. The international criminal justice machinery is still in its developing phase, and the ICC's prerogative is to ensure that its credibility and legitimacy is maintained throughout all its decisions. The
Chamber's decision to proceed in such a hurried way lacked common sense.
Moreover, the complete lack of a human rights perspective places the ICC in an awkward position regarding the interpretation and application of Article 21(3) Rome
Statute and its mandate to uphold 'international human rights standards'.
As a final note, this author is mindful of the fact that the defendant in this particular case was the sitting President of Kenya, and the ICC prosecutorial office must indeed be commended for its efforts to pursue a prominent state official for the crimes (he allegedly) perpetrated in Kenya. 177 We must remind ourselves that in the history of international criminal law this is the first time that such a prosecution is attempted against a sitting president. 178 It is specifically for this reason that the ICC must be thorough in the way it deals with the trial of a sitting president, as the lack of a transparent discussion may be misinterpreted as an attempt to undermine what is supposed to be a rigorous judicial process.
In fact, given the alleged claims concerning bribes and threats surrounding the witnesses in Mr Kenyatta's prosecution, 179 the dismissal of a discussion on judicial economy may weaken the Court's legitimacy and its mandate to uphold wellrecognised procedural principles. Fairness cannot be evaluated properly when an important discussion has been disregarded in the course of the judicial process, as it gives the impression of bias, either in favour and against the accused. After all, the suggestion that the ICC is an 'African Court' must be dispelled, 180 rather than fuelling antipathy between Kenya and the ICC. 181 It is conceivable that the ICC may never get the opportunity to prosecute a sitting president again. Just like the current case of Mr Laurent Gbango, 182 any future head of state appearing at the ICC as a defendant is likely to have lost an election or have resigned by the time the arrest and surrender to the ICC takes place. Clearly the symbolism about impunity accompanying the prosecution of a sitting president is astounding, and that message must not be underestimated. Nevertheless, it is vital that any issues in relation to procedural fairness are properly discussed and evaluated, though it is equally important that the evidence gathered at the initial investigative More importantly, in the following passage she also noted the need to attain a balancing exercise between the principle of expeditiousness and the right of the accused to be tried without undue delay, and in this context Furthermore, Judge Eboe-Osuji specifically indicated that Article 64(2) supports the power to declare a 'mistrial', a power further reinforced by the 'doctrine of incidental or implied powers under international law', 192 and therefore not limited by the 'applicable law' set out in Article 21. 193 In fact, the interpretation adopted by Judge Eboe-Osuji in the context of the right to a fair trial deserves some further analysis, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, as a concluding remark, it is significant that Judge Eboe-Osuji insisted in the adoption of a teleological interpretation in order to achieve fairer results for all participants. He asserted that the adoption of a 'broad and liberal construction to maximise protection of beneficiaries' 194 should not just apply to human rights and humanitarian law, but also to criminal law, as, ultimately, 'those beneficiaries are both victims of crimes and persons accused of crimes '. 195 In other words, the wider scope attributed to the concept of fairness, as seen in the dissenting opinion by Judge Carbuccia, is again reiterated by Judge Eboe-Osuji, leading to a controversial new concept in international criminal proceedings.
195) Ruto and Sang Acquittal, Judge Eboe-Osuji, para. 327.
